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ABSTRACT
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been used in digital forensics
to identify fake facial images. We investigated several DNN-based
forgery forensics models (FFMs) to examine whether they are secure
against adversarial attacks. We experimentally demonstrated the ex-
istence of individual adversarial perturbations (IAPs) and univer-
sal adversarial perturbations (UAPs) that can lead a well-performed
FFM to misbehave. Based on iterative procedure, gradient infor-
mation is used to generate two kinds of IAPs that can be used to
fabricate classification and segmentation outputs. In contrast, UAPs
are generated on the basis of over-firing. We designed a new objec-
tive function that encourages neurons to over-fire, which makes UAP
generation feasible even without using training data. Experiments
demonstrated the transferability of UAPs across unseen datasets and
unseen FFMs. Moreover, we conducted subjective assessment for
imperceptibility of the adversarial perturbations, revealing that the
crafted UAPs are visually negligible. These findings provide a base-
line for evaluating the adversarial security of FFMs.
Index Terms— forgery forensics, adversarial attack, over-firing
1. INTRODUCTION
Faces appearing in digital media are salient information that directly
reflects personal identity and scene content. Facial manipulation
programs, like DeepFakes [1], Face2Face and FaceSwap [2], can
be used to automatically edit facial identities and expressions so as
to alter the semantic content of the digital media. To deal with this
security threat, many countermeasures [3–12] have been proposed.
Inspired by presentation attack detection, researchers are attempt-
ing to use liveness clues like lip-syncing [3], eye blinking [4],
and inconsistency in head pose [5] to identify fake facial videos.
Another approach is to use inconsistent statistical characteristics
including IQM (image quality metrics) descriptor [6], color dispar-
ity [7], and warping artifacts [8] as telltale indicators for detecting
forgeries. DNNs have also been used to expose fake facial media
[9, 10]. To enhance transferability, Cozzolino et al. [11] designed
a selection-based domain adaptation mechanism over the latent
space of an autoencoder. A variation of this approach [12], using a
multi-task autoencoder, was proposed for simultaneously achieving
the forensic goals of forgery identification and localization. The
reported DNN-based FFMs [9–12] have exhibited outstanding per-
formance and shown great potential in security-sensitive intelligent
systems, such as fake news identification and electronic evidence
investigation.
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However, the security of these DNN-based FFMs [9–12] is prob-
lematic since an attacker may carefully fabricate a fake facial image
or video to circumvent the intelligent systems for getting higher but
illegal privilege. Recent works [13, 14] have revealed that adding a
tailor-made tiny noise to the bona fide input can easily induce a well-
performed DNN to produce misleading output. Previous works on
adversarial attacks mainly focused on tasks involving face recogni-
tion [15], object detection [16], semantic segmentation [17], natural
language processing [18], and malware detection [19]. There has
been a lack of work on whether FFMs are secure against adversarial
attacks. We aim to fill this gap, in this paper, by applying gradient-
based adversarial attacks (white box) to Nguyen’s FFM [12] and
evaluating the transferability of adversarial perturbations (black box)
across unseen datasets and unseen FFMs [10, 11].
Specifically, our contributions are as follows: 1. We show the
existence of IAPs, which can be used to fabricate classification or
segmentation outputs. 2. We show the existence of image-agnostic
UAPs for the FFM [12]. We present a newly designed objective
function that enables latent neurons to be over-fired without the need
for training data. 3. We present experimental results demonstrat-
ing that UAPs have transferability across unseen datasets and un-
seen FFMs [10, 11]. 4. Following an international standard [20],
we conduct subjective assessment for imperceptibility of adversar-
ial perturbations. This is a necessary step oriented towards practical
applications of the adversarial attack.
The experimental results presented in Section 3 support the
above claims and thereby demonstrate that existing FFMs [10–12]
are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. This work provides a warning
that future digital forensics research should take into account the
need to integrate an adversarial defense mechanism into FFMs.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we give a brief introduction of the target facial FFMs
[10–12], and then introduce fundamental concepts and impressive
achievements in the field of adversarial attack.
2.1. Target FFMs
In [10], Afchar et al. constructed a lightweight DNN with four con-
volutional layers and two fully connected layers, and furthermore
proposed an advanced network structure called ‘MesoInception-4’.
Inception modules consisting of vanilla convolutions, dilated convo-
lutions and skip-connections (1 × 1 convolutions) were introduced
for adaptively probing low-level image textures.
The ForensicTransfer method [11] is based on an autoencoder
architecture. For a given image xi, its residual map that only con-
tains high-frequency details is regarded as the input. Neurons in the
latent layer are divided equally into two disjoint portions: zero zone
hi,0 and one zone hi,1. The zone-wise activation energy is calculated
by ai,c = ‖hi,c‖1/Kc, where Kc counts the number of neurons in
the cth zone for c ∈ {0, 1}. The activation loss for an image xi
is defined as Lact(xi, li) = |ai,1 − li| + |ai,0 − (1 − li)|, where
li represents the category label, which takes the value 0 for ‘fake’
and 1 for ‘real’. The activation loss encourages the zone hi,c that
c = li to activate (ai,c > 0) while the other zone hi,1−c remains
silent (ai,1−c = 0). During the training phase, the selection module
compulsively zeros out the off-class zone hi,1−c, which forces the
decoder to complete its reconstruction task using only hi,c. During
the testing phase, an image xi is classified as c if ai,c > ai,1−c. This
encoder-selection-decoder framework forces the latent space to learn
discriminative representations and thus enhances the transferability
across multiple domains of image manipulations.
In [12], Nguyen et al. proposed a Y-shaped network that extends
the network of Cozzolino et al. [11] in three ways. First, the residual
module is abandoned so that a variety of features can be adaptively
probed by convolutional layers without constraints. Second, the au-
toencoder architecture is made deeper (with up to 18 convolutional
layers). Third, the decoder is designed as a two-pronged structure,
which enables three tasks (classification, segmentation, and recon-
struction) to share the information they learn and thereby enhance
overall performance. The segmentation branch is responsible for lo-
cating forged regions. Cross-entropy loss Lseg(xi,mi) is used to
evaluate the segmentation quality, where mi represents the ground-
truth mask.
In this paper, the above three representative FFMs [10–12] are
considered as the target models for examining the existence and ef-
fectiveness of adversarial perturbations. FaceForensics++ database
[21] was used to train or fine-tune the three FFMs. It consists of three
datasets, ‘DeepFakes’, ‘Face2Face’ and ‘FaceSwap’. Each dataset
contains 1000 real facial videos and 1000 manipulated ones. This
database also provides ground-truth masks that highlight the manip-
ulated regions in a pixel-wise manner. Data preparation followed
the procedure previously used in [11,12], so there were 2800 images
in each test set that would be used to evaluate the performance of
adversarial attacks.
2.2. Adversarial Attacks
Given an image xi and a target model f , an adversarial attack aims
to find a tiny perturbation, denoted by ξi, so that the corresponding
adversarial image xadvi = xi + ξi can change the output of f , i.e.,
f(xi) 6= f(x
adv
i ). During the course of seeking ξi, its magnitude,
which is usually measured by the p-norm distance, is bounded by a
small value to ensure its imperceptibility.
In the pioneering work [22], Szegedy et al. generated adver-
sarial perturbations by using a box-constrained L-BFGS. However,
this method is relatively time-consuming. A suitable value of hy-
perparameter c that modulates the balance between two terms in the
objective function is unknown. This therefore requires an additional
line-searching to adaptively update c.
Fast gradient sign method (FGSM) proposed by Goodfellow et
al. [23] is an efficient one-time method without iterations. An adver-
sarial image is generated by slightly adapting each pixel along the di-
rection of the sign of gradient. Basic iterative method (BIM) [24] is
an intuitive extension of FGSM. It iteratively generates an adversar-
ial perturbation with a smaller step size, which enables the updating
direction to be adjusted after each iteration.
Deepfool [25] was proposed for finding a minimal perturbation
ξi that could just push xi outside its own classification region. An
iterative procedure is used to gradually estimate ξi under the as-
sumption that the linearity of f holds around xi at each iteration.
In [26], Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. leveraged the Deepfool method to
craft an image-agnostic UAP Ξ that can fool the target model f , i.e.,
f(xi) 6= f(xi +Ξ), for a vast majority of xi. The crafted UAP was
empirically demonstrated to transfer well across multiple architec-
tures including VGG, CaffeNet, GoogLeNet, and ResNet.
The idea of Mopuri et al.’s work [27] is to seek a UAP that
can over-fire the neurons (maximizing the activation energies) at
each layer. Such a UAP would contaminate the learned features and
thereby lead the target model to misbehave. Particularly interesting
is that the training phase for over-firing can be done in a data-free
manner.
In this paper, the gradient information itself (rather than the
signed version) was used for generating IAPs. Inspired by the idea of
over-firing, we crafted UAPs without using training data. However,
we found that, for autoencoder network [12], it is difficult to achieve
over-firing due to the small magnitude of the perturbation-only in-
put. We solved this problem by designing a new objective function
that strongly promotes over-firing of the latent neurons in the desired
zone (see Section 3.2).
3. ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATIONS FOR FFMS
In this section, we mount the adversarial attacks against the FFM
[12] for different falsification purposes. First, we craft two kinds
of IAPs for each image, one for fabricating classification output and
one for fabricating segmentation output. Next, we craft UAPs in
accordance with the idea of over-firing and evaluate their transfer-
ability across unseen datasets and unseen FFMs [10,11]. Finally, we
describe the settings for the subjective assessment and summarize
the insights gained from the assessment into the imperceptibility of
adversarial perturbations.
3.1. Individual adversarial attacks
Given an image xi, we iteratively generate a tailor-made IAP that
can flip the original classification output. The iterative procedure
can be written as:
ξ
(n+1)
i = Clipǫ
{
ξ
(n)
i − α(∇xiLact(xi + ξ
(n)
i , l
adv
i ))
}
, (1)
where ξ
(n)
i denotes the adversarial perturbation at the n
th iteration
while α represents the step size. The iterative procedure starts with
ξ
(0)
i = 0. At each iteration, the operator Clipǫ(·) restricts the pertur-
bation’s magnitude within [−ǫ, ǫ] to ensure imperceptibility. Adver-
sarial label ladvi satisfying l
adv
i 6= li enables the fabricated output to
be controlled. For a binary classification problem (‘real’ or ‘fake’), it
is easy to prepare the adversarial label: ladvi = 1−li. The sign opera-
tor previously used in FGSM and BIM is excluded from our iterative
procedure since we consider that not only the direction but also the
length of the gradient is informative in generating IAPs. Note that
only the activation loss is used in Eq.(1) because the classification is
performed in accordance with the zone-wise activation energy. We
set α = 1.0 and ǫ = 2.5 throughout our experiments.
Table 1 shows that adding IAPs drastically reduced classification
accuracies. The small RMSE (root mean squared error) scores, how-
ever, suggest perceptual similarities between xi and x
adv
i . More im-
portantly, 20 iterations for each image were sufficient to destory the
well-performed FFM [12] over the three datasets. Furthermore, the
Intersection-over-Union (IoU) scores were dramatically suppressed
at the same time although the segmentation loss Lseg(xi, mi) was
absent from the iterative procedure. This is because only activated
latent features hi,c were selected for the following decoder, so
the classification output greatly affected the segmentation branch.
Table 1. Performance of IAPs (fabricating classification outputs).
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fig. 1. Resulting examples (selected from: FaceSwap & 20 iters).
(a) Original images. (b) Adversarial images. (c) Adversarial pertur-
bations (min-max scaled for display). (d) Ground-truth masks. (e)
Segmentation outputs.
This phenomenon is reflected in the two resulting examples shown
in Fig.1, in which the segmentation outputs, i.e., the column (e),
agree with the fabricated classification outputs.
We also purposely fabricate incorrect segmentation outputs for
fake images to mislead tampering localization judgement. In this
scenario, the adversarial ground-truth masks madvi , as shown in
Fig.2 (a), are prepared in advance. The goal is to slightly adapt
the pixels of xi, making segmentation output as similar as possi-
ble to madvi . To this end, we define a weighted objective function
L = Lact(xi, l
adv
i ) + λ · Lseg(xi,m
adv
i ), where λ is set to 1.8 em-
pirically. Then, this objective function is substituted into Eq.(1) for
iterative computations. Here, the adversarial label ladvi is assigned
a value close to but less than 0.5 (for example 0.45)1 in this sce-
nario. Such a setting loosens the interaction between classification
and segmentation, while still ensuring that the zero zone h0,i is
activated.
Figure 2 shows the corresponding resulting examples. Obvi-
ously, the fabricated masks (d) closely match the adversarial ones
(a), and are much different from the original ones. For quantitative
evaluation, it is time-consuming to manually create a meaningful ad-
versarial mask for every image. For a quick experiment, we assume
that an adversarial mask follows a simple geometry, i.e., a triangle,
as shown by the bottom image in Fig.2 (a). The location and ori-
entation of the triangle are randomly assigned for each image. The
results of the quantitative evaluation are summarized in Table 2. The
IoU scores w.r.t the adversarial masks were as high as 48.52% while
those w.r.t the original masks were reduced on average from 43.21%
to 22.04%. This means that adding IAPs leads the segmentation out-
1Recall that label ‘fake’ takes the value 0 in this paper.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 2. Resulting examples (selected from: FaceSwap & 500 iters).
(a) Adversarial mask. (b) Adversarial images. (c) Adversarial per-
turbations (min-max scaled for display). (d) Segmentation outputs.
Original images and their ground-truth masks are shown in Fig.1.
Table 2. Performance of IAPs (fabricating classification outputs).
Only ‘fake’ images were considered in this scenario, so scores in the
‘original’ rows differ from those in Table 1.
puts being more similar to the adversarial masks. It may be difficult
to further reduce the IoU scores in this quick experiment because a
triangle with a random location and orientation may partly overlap
the original highlighted area. Interestingly, the classification accu-
racy got a rise in this scenario. This is because the setting ladvi = 0.45
forced the zero zone to activate, which provided a chance to correct
previously misclassified outputs. In addition, fabricating a segmen-
tation output needs 100 or more iterations, which has a higher com-
putational cost than falsification for classification.
3.2. Universal adversarial attacks
In this scenario, we aim to craft a data-free UAP Ξ that can flip
the classification outputs for most images. The iterative procedure
starts with a random perturbation in which the entries obey a uniform
distribution [−ǫ, ǫ]. For the autoencoder network [12], it is nontrivial
to activate the latent neurons at the initial iterations due to the small
magnitude of the perturbation-only input. To overcome this problem,
we designed a new objective function:
L(Ξ) = exp
(κ · ai,1−c
ai,c
)
− ai,c, (2)
where ai,c and ai,1−c denote the activation energy of hi,c and
hi,1−c, respectively. The iterative procedure for updating Ξ can be
formulated as
Ξ(n+1) = Clipǫ
{
Ξ(n) − α(∇L(Ξ(n)))
}
. (3)
Fig. 3. UAPs (min-max scaled for display) generated for fabricating
classification outputs.
Table 3. Performance of UAPs: image-agnostic property and trans-
ferability across unseen datasets.
Clearly, minimizing the objective function in Eq.(2) is equivalent to
maximizing ai,c. At the beginning of the iteration procedure, both
ai,c and ai,1−c are small, and we have ai,c ≈ ai,1−c in most cases.
If we set κ > 1.0, the exponential term in Eq.(2) can amplify the
difference between ai,c and ai,1−c so as to initially provide a suffi-
cient loss. After several iterations, the value of the exponential term
approaches 1 while the negative term becomes a potency to further
minimize the loss.
Only 280 iterations were needed to generate an effective UAP in
our experiments, which were performed in a data-free manner. This
demonstrates that over-firing is a resource-conserving approach for
attackers. Looking at the generated UAPs in Fig.3, we observe sim-
ilar local textures organized with different styles. For each dataset,
two UAPs which can over-fire the two disjoint zones, are crafted
separately. As shown in Table 3, classification accuracy was reduced
on average from 91.98% (orange shading) to 3.17% (blue shading),
which demonstrates the image-agnostic property of UAPs. Evalu-
ation of transferability across unseen datasets showed that adding
UAPs reduced accuracy 33.63% on average (gray shading). As a
reference, uniform random noises (URNs) with the same level of
strength only achieved a slight drop of 11.28% (green shading).
UAP transferability across unseen models is highly desirable,
especially when the adversary has no knowledge of such models.
The UAPs computed for the FFM [12] directly transfer to attack
other target FFMs [10, 11]. Table 4 shows the evaluation results
(brown ink for [11]). Note that the FFM [11] is reimplemented here
without including the residual module. As shown in Table 4, the
UAPs
reduced average accuracies by 19.19% and 24.06%, respectively,
for the two unseen FFMs. Again, the UAPs outperform the URNs,
which demonstrates that an adversarial attack based on over-firing
can probe special noise patterns that contaminate the learned fea-
tures even though the network architectures differ. Interestingly, if
we retain the residual module for the FFM [11], the UAPs and URNs
have comparable performance, i.e., an average drop of around 30%
(not shown in Table 4). The reasons for this are twofold. First, the
residual module extracts high-frequency details, which renders the
Table 4. Performance of UAPs: transferability across unseen FFMs.
Table 5. Results of subjective assessment.
whole model sensitive to both kinds of perturbations. Second, the
residual maps may lie in a region far from the manifold of original
data, so transferability is no longer effective.
3.3. Subjective assessment
Imperceptibility is an essential requirement for adversarial per-
turbations. However, the objective criteria like RMSE can not
dutifully reflect the perceptual loss caused by local but condensed
distortions. We conducted subjective assessment for the visual
quality of adversarial images by using the degradation category
rating method [20]. We asked evaluators to compare a clean image
with its noisy version and then to rate the quality degradation on
a 5-point mean opinion score scale, with 5 being the least degra-
dation. We selected IAPs (all groups of ‘20 iters’), UAPs and
URNs as the distortion sources, and compared the clean image
with itself as a baseline. As such, there were four conditions,
each consisting of 300 pairs selected at random. We exhibited
some pairs at https://nii-yamagishilab.github.io/
Samples-Rong/Image-AE-attack/.
The evaluation was performed through a web-based interface,
with each web page horizontally displaying a pair of images. We
grouped 21 pairs into a set, and each evaluator was permitted to
evaluate at most 5 sets. We collected a total of 39680 legitimate
scores from 775 evaluators. As shown in Table 5, the UAP and URN
scores were comparable and close to baseline 4.49. This demon-
strates that UAPs are visually negligible. The lower IAP score sug-
gests that local but condensed distortions are prone to serious percep-
tual losses. Therefore, future work on individual adversarial attacks
should enforce a constraint based on local smoothness.
4. CONCLUSION
Our study had demonstrated the existence of adversarial perturba-
tions for FFMs. The gradient-based iterative procedure generates
IAPs that can be used to fabricate classification and segmentation
outputs. Without the need for training data, UAPs are crafted to over-
fire the latent neurons. The objective function we designed provides
a sufficient initial loss, which makes the over-firing practical with
lightweight computational cost. Our experiments demonstrated that
UAPs have transferability across unseen datasets and unseen FFMs,
and our subjective assessment showed that the distortions incurred
by UAPs are visually negligible. This work can serve as a base-
line for evaluating the adversarial security of FFMs. Future work
includes developing a defense module that can protect FFMs against
adversarial attacks.
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